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Abstract 
This paper critically analyses the normative strength of claims that national authorities – and 
in particular national parliaments - would be justified in refusing to give effect to judgments of 
international human rights courts (IHRCs) with which they are in substantive disagreement, 
and the related argument that a ‘democratic override’ mechanism should be built into all strong 
international human rights law (SIHRL) frameworks to give adequate legal recognition to this 
‘right to disobey’. It examines the strength of the ‘democratic constitutionalist’ critique of 
IHRCs that underpins these arguments, and concludes that national parliaments will only be 
justified in refusing to give effect to judgments of IHRCs in exceptional circumstances. As a 
consequence, there exists no compelling reason to destabilise existing SILs to accommodate 
the rare instances where such national ‘disobedience’ will be justifiable. These arguments are 
developed with particular reference to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the 
best-developed SIHRL framework.    
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1. Introduction  
States which have agreed to be bound by ‘strong’ international human rights law (SIHRL) 
frameworks – such as the ECHR - are expected to respect and give effect to judgments of the 
supranational courts established to interpret and apply the provisions of the relevant human 
rights instruments.1 Thus Article 46 of the ECHR requires state parties to comply with 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘the Strasbourg Court’). 
Similarly, Article 68(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights imposes similar 
obligations in respect to judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. As the case-
law of these courts has developed, state parties to both these conventions have thus been 
obliged to adjust various elements of national law and policy to stay in conformity with their 
international law obligations. As a result, such SIHRL frameworks have come to play an 
important role in public governance: the freedom of action of national authorities, including 
national parliaments, is limited by the need to maintain conformity with their requirements.   
This is particularly true of the ECHR. The case-law of the Strasbourg Court has come to exert 
wide-ranging influence over European legal systems. State parties to the Convention 
                                                          
1 In contrast, ‘weak’ international human rights frameworks do not impose specific obligations upon state parties 
to give effect to decisions of the relevant adjudicative bodies. Examples would include the monitoring mechanisms 
established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other UN human rights treaties. 
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consistently defer to its decisions,2 while national authorities generally respect the legal norms 
laid down by the Court. As a result, the Court’s jurisprudence exerts a considerable influence 
over the functioning of democratic governance across Europe.3  
Indeed, the authority now exerted by the Strasbourg Court is sometimes cited as an example of 
how European states have abandoned rigid adherence to state-centred constitutionalism and 
embraced ‘legal cosmopolitanism’, understood to involve the subordination of national laws to 
transnational human rights norms and the elevation of the individual, as distinct from the nation 
or the state, as the main focus of legal concern.4 In general, SIHRL frameworks are often 
viewed as key vectors of legal cosmopolitanism – while the deference shown by national 
institutions to the judgments of IHRCs is regularly cited as evidence that states are no longer 
complete masters of their own domains.  
However, for all this talk, SIHRL regimes still exist in a legal framework which is still 
predominantly shaped by what Kumm describes as the ‘statist paradigm’, i.e. the assumption 
that the state remains the locus of legitimate legal and political authority.5 The authority of 
IHRCS is based upon the consent of states to be bound by their judgments, which can - at least 
formally - be withdrawn by a state denouncing the relevant treaty instrument. Furthermore, as 
decisions of IHRCs do not have direct effect within national law (unlike for example, 
judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU), their authority is contingent upon the willingness 
of national authorities to give effect to their judgments: IHRCs cannot require national 
parliaments, executives or courts to defer to their determinations, as the prisoner voting saga 
discussed by Ed Bates in the preceding chapter has illustrated in the context of the UK and 
ECHR. Finally, IHRCs may as a matter of international law have the final say as to how the 
provisions of human rights treaties are to be interpreted and applied. However, their authority 
in this respect co-exists with the potentially competing authority claims of national 
constitutional actors, who as a matter of domestic law generally retain the final say when it 
comes to determining the content of national law.  
Taken together, this means that IHRCS occupy an uncertain place in a legal order which 
remains structured around the principle of state sovereignty. Their functioning reflects a 
cosmopolitan understanding of the relationship between national law and supranational human 
rights standards, but this plays out against a background which remains dominated by the 
‘statist paradigm’. As a result, the relationship between SIHRL frameworks and domestic legal 
systems is inevitably pluralist, flexible and ‘heterarchical’ in nature, to use Krisch’s 
terminology.6 National authorities must be persuaded to defer to judgments of IHRCs if their 
                                                          
2 Certain countries have better compliance records than others: for a discussion of the attitude of the Russian 
Federation to the Court, see J. Lapitskaya, 'ECHR, Russia, and Chechyna: Two is not company and three is 
definitely a crowd', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 43 (2) (2010-11), 479-548. 
3 Various commentators have argued that the Strasbourg Court now functions in effect as a type of pan-European 
constitutional court, at least when it comes to legal issues that concern questions of fundamental rights: see e.g. 
S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). However, this ‘constitutional court’ analogy is problematic in certain 
respects, and needs to be applied with care.  
4 See e.g. A. Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in 
Europe’, Journal of Global Constitutionalism 1(1) (2012), 53-90. 
5 M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism in 
and Beyond the State’, in J. L. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 258 – 325, 315. 
6 N. Krisch, 'The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law', Modern Law Review, 71(2) (2008), 183-
216.  
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interpretation of human rights standards are to be respected and implemented – and this 
inevitably imposes certain de facto constraints upon IHRCs in developing their case-law.7 
However, the ability of national authorities to reject judgments of IHRCs and thus to evade 
their treaty obligations is also subject to substantial legal and political limitations.8  
The slippery and uncertain nature of this relationship inevitably ends up generating a degree of 
tension between IHRCs and national authorities. Such tensions can often be mediated through 
a process of inter-institutional dialogue. However, at times, they cannot be easily resolved, as 
again illustrated by the UK prisoner voting saga. When that happens, the uncertain nature of 
the relationship between SIHRL frameworks and national legal systems is exposed. Is it 
possible to reconcile the inherent cosmopolitanism of the former with the statist orientation of 
the latter? Are there circumstances in which national institutions can legitimately refuse to give 
effect to judgments of IHRCs? When might a state be justified in arguing that IHRCs have 
exceeded the permissible bounds of their authority, or even choose to repudiate its obligations 
under an instrument such as the ECHR?  
No easy answers exist to any of these questions. Some commentators like to point to the binding 
nature of the legal obligations states assume when they ratify an instrument such as the ECHR, 
and suggest that this should end all debate in this context. But this is too simplistic. It ignores 
the manner in which issues of compliance with SIHRL norms are linked to wider issues relating 
to the legitimacy of supranational adjudication and its relationship to democratic governance 
at national level. It also glosses over the reality that the SIHRL mechanisms designed to secure 
state compliance with IHRC judgments afford national authorities a degree of wriggle room, 
which they can use to delay, minimise or even evade their obligation to abide by IHRC rulings 
while still formally adhering to the norms of the relevant treaty framework in question.9 Legal 
formalism does not provide clear answers to the question of how states should behave when 
called upon to give effect to IHRC judgments of which they disapprove.  
Instead, what is required is greater normative clarity as to the norms that should guide state 
conduct in this regard. In particular, the question arises as to when it is legitimate for national 
authorities – and specifically national legislatures, as the primary law-making body within any 
given national constitutional framework – to refuse to give effect to a judgment of IHRCs? 
Such acts of ‘civil disobedience’ – viewed from the perspective of international law, if not from 
the perspective of domestic law – are rare, especially within the framework of the ECHR. States 
often seek to minimise or circumvent the impact of Strasbourg judgments on their domestic 
law, or drag their feet in giving effect to them: however, a refusal to give effect to a judgment 
is a ‘nuclear option’ which states have historically been slow to use. However, the possibility 
of its deployment can cast a perpetual shadow over the relationship between Strasbourg and 
national legislatures, as illustrated by the current debate in the UK on the status of the ECHR, 
as again described by Ed Bates in this book. As a result, it is necessary to discuss when national 
parliaments may legitimately ‘disobey’ binding judgments of IHRCs – which in turn involves 
                                                          
7 Cali has described this ‘problematic’ as constituting a permanent ‘crisis of political legitimacy’ for the Strasbourg 
Court. See B. Cali, ‘The Limits of International Justice at the European Court of Human Rights: Between Legal 
Cosmopolitanism and “A Society of States’”, in M.-B. Dembour and T. Kelly (eds.), Paths to International 
Justice: Social and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 111-133. 
8 Ibid. 
9 For example, the UK has dragged its feet in giving effect to the Hirst v UK (No 2) (2005) 42 EHRR 41 judgment 
on prisoner voting for over ten years. 
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some consideration of what constitutes the basis of the authority exercised by IHRCs, as well 
as its potential limits. 
2. Contesting the Authority of IHRCs: The ‘Mandate Abuse’ and ‘Democratic 
Constitutionalist’ Lines of Attack  
The authority of IHRCs is generally viewed as founded upon state consent. Once states ratify 
an international treaty, they are assumed to be bound by its provisions, including any 
requirement to comply with decisions of any adjudicative body established under that treaty.10 
Thus, for example, the authority of the Strasbourg Court is founded upon the agreement of state 
parties to establish the Strasbourg Court and to abide by its judgments, as set out in Articles 32 
to 51 of the ECHR. This voluntary commitment is generally understood both to confer 
legitimacy upon the Strasbourg Court and also to impose a binding normative obligation on 
state parties to respect its decisions, in line with the principle of pacta sund servanda.11 
However, as Cali notes, this ‘standard account’ of why judgments of IHRCs should be viewed 
as binding upon state parties is vulnerable to a number of potential objections. In particular, it 
is open to the challenge that at best it establishes a pro tanto obligation to respect decisions of 
IHRCs, which can be outweighed by states invoking principled reasons for disregarding this 
obligation. 12  
In particular, two sets of principled reasons are periodically put forward by states as to why 
they would be justified in disregarding an IHRC judgment, namely that the IHRC in question 
has (i) exceeded the limits of its mandates (the ‘mandate abuse’ objection) and/or (ii) is 
exercising authority over national law to a degree which is incompatible with the democratic 
constitutionalist ideal that a state should ultimately be governed by institutions which are 
established by and accountable to a national demos (the ‘democratic constitutionalist’ 
objection). As discussed below, it is the ‘democratic constitutionalist’ objection that offers the 
most serious challenge to the authority of IHRCs – and is also the harder to rebut. 
2.1  The ‘Mandate Abuse’ Objection 
The first line of attack – the ‘mandate abuse’ claim – is invoked when national authorities 
object to judgments of an IHRC on the basis that the court in question has exceeded the scope 
of its mandate and thereby is no longer operating within the bounds of what Cali describes as 
the ‘democratic endorsement international law receives at the time of its making’.13 In essence, 
this claim is structured around the assumption that the obligation of state parties to abide by 
judgments of an IHRC does not extend to judgments which unduly stretch the finite scope of 
the interpretative mandate originally conferred upon the IHRC in question. IHRCs are viewed 
as having been ‘lent’ their powers by state parties who use them as agents in advancing a 
                                                          
10 Cali describes how the ‘standard account’ of the authority claims of international law is based in part upon a 
‘relaxed notion of [state] consent’: see B. Cali, ‘The Disciplinary Account of the Authority of International 
Law:  Does It Stand Firm against Its External Critics?’, European Society of International Law: Reflection, 5(5) 
10 May 2016, available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/1329 (last accessed 30 May 2016). See also in general B. 
Cali, Authority of International Law: Obedience, Respect and Rebuttal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
11 G. Letsas, ‘The ECHR as Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’, in G. Ulfstein, A. Føllesdal and B. 
Peters (eds.) Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global 
Context (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 106-141, p. 138-141. 
12 Cali, ‘The Disciplinary Account’.  
13 Ibid. 
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common purpose: however, if an IHRC oversteps the limits of its assigned authority, then the 
state is not bound by its decisions.  
This is the type of argument made by British politicians when they assert that the judgments of 
the Strasbourg Court relating to prisoner voting rights represent an unjustified extension of its 
original, limited interpretative function - namely to interpret and apply the ECHR as 
establishing minimum guarantees against serious abuses of rights such as those committed by 
Fascist dictatorships during the 1930s and 1940s. As Bates notes in the previous chapter, this 
allegation that the Strasbourg Court has abused its mandate has been used to justify UK non-
compliance with Hirst v UK (No 2): in parliamentary debates, the Strasbourg Court has been 
accused of over-reaching itself and acting beyond the scope of the legitimate authority, thus 
entitling the UK Parliament to disregard its obligation under Article 46 of the ECHR to abide 
by this judgment of the Strasbourg Court.  
However, claims of mandate abuse are relatively common – and often fail to establish a 
convincing case as to why national authorities are entitled to disregard an IHRC judgment. As 
Cali notes, IHRCs have been given the power to lay down binding decisions as to the scope 
and content of human rights norms precisely because no consensus exists among state parties 
as to how exactly these norms should be interpreted and applied.14 Furthermore, state parties 
have agreed to treat IHRC judgments as being legally binding, even if they disagree with their 
content: as Letsas puts it with reference to the Strasbourg Court, ‘the ECHR contracting states 
wanted to create not only legally binding obligations but also legally binding determinations 
of when these obligations have been breached...’15 By signing up to the jurisdiction of IHRCs, 
states have therefore committed themselves to accepting their judgments – which by extension 
entails accepting IHRC determinations as to the scope and content of the rights set out in the 
relevant treaty.  
National authorities will thus only have substantial grounds for disregarding IHRC judgments 
if they can show that an IHRC clearly abused its interpretative mandate, by perhaps acting in 
bad faith or failing to reason in a principled manner: absent such special circumstances, mere 
disagreement with a decision is not a convincing basis for repudiating the voluntarily-assumed 
obligation of states to abide by IHRC judgments.16 Furthermore, given that IHRCs usually take 
considerable care to produce reasoned justifications for their decisions, states will generally 
struggle to show the existence of bad faith or blatantly flawed reasoning. As a consequence, 
national parliaments may often criticise an IHRC judgment and make allegations of mandate 
abuse – but they will only begin to establish a strong normative case for disregarding their self-
imposed commitment to abide by that judgment if they can make a convincing case that the 
IHRC acted in bad faith or on the basis of wholly inadequate reasoning.17 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Letsas, ‘The ECHR as Living Instrument’, p. 139. 
16 An analogy may be drawn here to the manner in which, in the private law of both common and civil law systems, 
principals will be deemed liable for the acts of their agents, irrespective of whether they endorsed or approved of 
these acts, as long as the act in question is the type of act the agent was authorised to do. See e.g. the English 
common law position as set out by Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium Co Limited v Salaam & Ors [2003] 2 AC 
366, para. 122.. 
17 Letsas, ‘The ECHR as Living Instrument’,  p. 139-141. For example, the judgment in Hirst v UK (No 2) (2006) 
42 EHRR 41 would appear neither to involve ‘bad faith or ‘wholly inadequate reasoning’: see in general C. 
Murray, ‘We Need to Talk: “Democratic dialogue” and the ongoing saga of prisoner disenfranchisement’ (2011) 
62(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 57-74. 
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2.2  The ‘Democratic Constitutionalist’ Objection  
The second line of attack – the ‘democratic constitutionalist’ claim – goes deeper than 
allegations of mandate abuse. Claims that IHRCs have exceeded their mandate implicitly 
assume that such courts will be acting legitimately if they respect the confines of that mandate, 
however defined; and, as discussed above, such claims are inherently difficult to establish. 
However, the democratic constitutionalist critique strikes at the heart of the legitimacy claims 
of SIHRL. It calls into question whether it is compatible with democratic first principles for 
IHRCs to play a significant role in shaping national law, and by extension whether national 
parliaments and other domestic authorities should consider themselves bound to give effect to 
IHRC judgments which they view as involving a substantial transgression upon popular 
sovereignty.18 It is also more difficult to rebut than allegations of mandate abuse, not least 
because it touches upon a fundamental point of uncertainty in the relationship between SIHRL 
and national legal systems.    
This critique is built around the assumption that national authorities who are democratically 
accountable to a particular demos, or whose powers are derived from the exercise of the 
constituent power of that demos, should have primary responsibility for shaping the law of the 
land and determining the scope and content of fundamental rights – and that any substantive 
delegation of that law-shaping power to supranational institutions such as IHRCs, which lack 
a firm democratic constitutionalist foundation, is inherently problematic.19 According to this 
critique, the greater the extent to which the case-law of IHRCs restricts the freedom of action 
of national parliaments and other domestic law-making bodies, the greater the extent to which 
the principle of national self-determination is undermined. By logical extension, this suggests 
that national authorities are entitled to resist any such excessive transfer of authority, by 
refusing to abide by IHRC judgments which are deemed to constitute a substantial interference 
with the exercise of collective self-governance at the national level.20 
In other words, this critique suggests that the authority of IHRCs is subject to certain limits 
derived from democratic first principles – and that national parliaments and other bodies will 
be entitled to ‘disobey’ IHRC judgments which they deem to be insufficiently respectful of the 
right of a sovereign people to govern themselves through the constituted form of the nation 
state. It also suggests that it is constitutionally unsound in general for IHRCs to play too 
influential a role in shaping national law, as this involves a transfer of power away from the 
                                                          
18 Buchanan and Powell describe these arguments as ‘incompatibilist concerns’, as they suggest that state 
deference to international law standards can be in incompatible with constitutional democracy: see A. Buchanan 
and R. Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are They Compatible?’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 16(3) (2008), 326–349.  
19 N. Krisch, 'The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law', Modern Law Review, 71(2) (2008), 183-
216; see also the discussion in A Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power’, 
Constellations, 12 (2005), 223.  
20 This critique has particular resonance for states such as the UK, whose constitutional systems give their national 
legislatures (and not national courts) the final say over the scope and content of fundamental rights. However, any 
national institution charged by the demos with performing a decision-making role in this regard might potentially 
be able to invoke the democratic constitutionalist objection as a justification for refusing to give effect to an IHRC 
judgment: see for example the recent judgment of the 19 April 2016 issued by the Russian Constitutional Court 
relating to the ECHR case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, Applications nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, 
Judgment of 4 July 2013, discussed by K. Dzehtsiarou et al, ‘Imaginary Dialogue and Fictitious Collaboration: 
Russian Response to the Prisoner Voting’, ECHR Blog, 29 April 2016, available at 
http://echrblog.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/the-russian-response-to-prisoner-voting.html (last accessed 29 May 
2016). 
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democratically unaccountable organs of the state to an unaccountable and inherently 
undemocratic supranational system of governance.21  
In Europe, it used to be rare for the Strasbourg Court to attract criticism from this democratic 
constitutionalist perspective. However, things have changed – especially in the UK. In 2009, a 
leading British judge, Lord Hoffmann, took the opportunity of giving a lecture to the Judicial 
Studies Board on the verge of his retirement as a Law Lord to launch a full-on assault on the 
Strasbourg Court: he described the establishment of the Strasbourg Court as an ‘error’, and 
questioned why a supranational court which lacked a clear democratic constitutionalist 
mandate should exercise so much influence on the development of English law.22 Similar 
arguments have subsequently been made by other UK politicians and judges,23 and have 
influenced the decision of the Conservative Party in its 2015 election manifesto to commit itself 
to making ‘our own Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of human rights matters in the UK’.24  
In general, as discussed by Bates in the preceding chapter, the democratic constitutionalist 
critique has come to loom large in the UK debate about the status and legitimacy of the 
Strasbourg Court. Claims of mandate abuse in respect to the Hirst judgment still persist, but 
Strasbourg sceptics have widened their point of attack to include the entirety of the existing 
relationship between the ECHR and UK law. Some commentators have argued that a 
‘democratic override’ should be built into the Strasbourg system of rights protection, allowing 
national parliaments to overturn decisions of the Court.25 Others have called for the UK to 
withdraw from the ECHR, on the basis that the binding obligation to abide by judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court is incompatible with the principle of democratic self-government and the 
established sovereign authority of the Westminster Parliament.  
Similar concerns have been articulated in other European states, in particular Russia.26 In Latin 
America, democratic constitutionalist concerns are also increasingly being invoked to call the 
authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights into question.27 These same concerns 
                                                          
21 Note that this democratic constitutionalist critique, which objects to international courts instead of national 
authorities having the ‘final say’ over important issues related to the enjoyment of fundamental rights, should be 
distinguished from critiques of judicial power that are based on political constitutionalist principles, which object 
to unelected judges having the final say over matters that should be determined by elected politicians. The two 
critiques will often overlap, especially in the situation of the UK where the elected legislature enjoys sovereign 
law-making powers. However, their points of emphasis can differ in significant ways: for example, the democratic 
constitutionalist concerns about national courts deferring to IHRC judgments is less likely to trouble political 
constitutionalists, who may in contrast prefer indirect judicial supervision by IHRCs to the more direct forms of 
supervision usually exerted by national apex courts: see R Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International 
Human Rights Conventions: Political Constitutionalism and the European Convention of Human Rights’, 
European Journal of International Law, 25(4) (2015), 1019.     
22 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Law Quarterly Review, 125 (2009), 416. 
23 See e.g. the comments of Jack Straw MP, House of Commons Debate, 10 Feb 2011, cols. 502-504.  
24 UK Conservative Party, Manifesto 2015, p. 60. 
25 See e.g. M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Bring Rights Back Home: Making human rights compatible with parliamentary 
democracy in the UK (London: Policy Exchange, 2011), p. XX. 
26 See P. Leach and A. Donald, ‘Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?’, EJIL Talk, 19 December 
2015, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/ (last accessed 27 May 
2016). For a flavour of the criticism that the Strasbourg Court can occasionally attract in the Netherlands, see T. 
Baudet, ‘The Anti-democratic Impulses of the ECHR: The European Court of Human Rights has become a 
ravening monster overriding the rights of individual states’, Spiked Online, 19th January 2011, available at 
http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/printable/10087/ (last accessed 23th May 2016). 
27 See e.g. Venezuela’s denunciation of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, analysed 
by J. Harrington, ‘Venezuela Denounces American Convention on Human Rights’, EJIL Talk, 12 September 
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have also begun to feature more prominently in academic writing on the topic of SIHRL and 
the legitimacy of ‘strong’ international law norms more generally. For example, Jed Rubenfeld 
has questioned the democratic legitimacy of forms of international law which impose 
substantial constraints on state sovereignty, highlighting their lack of a firm grounding in an 
exercise of the popular will.28 In the European context, Andreas von Staden has highlighted the 
need for IHRCs to be guided by a strong attachment to the principle of ‘normative subsidiarity’ 
if they are to compensate for their limited democratic legitimacy and the manner in which their 
authority sits uncomfortably with the ‘ideal of self-government’ that he sees as forming the 
core of democracy.29  
The increased salience of the democratic constitutionalist critique in contemporary debates 
about SIHLR is striking. It arguably reflects wider concerns about international law becoming 
a tool of ‘domination’, as Cali puts it – i.e. a mode of governance that limits the exercise of 
democratic choice at national level.30 The case-law of IHRCS, as seen in the Strasbourg Court, 
now imposes a relatively substantial degree of restraint upon the freedom of action of national 
authorities, at a time when human rights values are under political attack: it is thus not 
surprising that challenges to the authority of IHRCs are increasingly framed in the language of 
democratic constitutionalism.  
The democratic constitutionalist objection thus has potency. It enables national parliaments 
and other state  parties to make a democratic case as to why they are entitled to ‘disobey’ their 
obligation to give effect to IHRC judgments in order to vindicate the principle of popular 
sovereignty. As such, this objection has a deeper normative grounding than allegations of 
mandate abuse, and is easier to justify: it invokes democratic first principles to call into 
question the inherent legitimacy of IHRCs, irrespective of the virtues or vices of their case-
law. It is also a form of attack that national parliaments are particularly well-positioned to 
deploy, given their claim to be the directly elected representatives of the people at large – as 
demonstrated by the rhetoric used by parliamentarians in the prisoner voting controversy in the 
UK.  
The democratic constitutionalist objection is therefore likely to loom large in future interactions 
between national parliaments and IHRCs, and is much less easy to dismiss than claims of 
mandate abuse. Therefore, the rest of this paper will focus on this critique of the authority of 
IHRCs and the influence they exert over national law, and the arguments that can be made in 
response.  
3. Trying (and Failing?) to Justify the Authority of IHRCs – Amelioration, Consent 
and Democratic Constraint  
                                                          
2012, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/venezuela-denounces-american-convention-on-human-rights/ (last 
accessed 28 May 2016). 
28 J. Rubenfeld, ‘Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’, New York University Law Review, 79 (2004), 1971. 
29 A. von Staden, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative subsidiarity and 
judicial standards of review’, I-CON, 10(4) (2012), 1023. See also S. Wheatley, ‘On the Legitimate Authority of 
international Human Rights Bodies’, in A. Føllesdal, J.K. Schaffer and G. Ulfstein (eds) The Legitimacy of 
International Human Rights Regimes (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 103; and note von Bogdandy and Venzke’s 
nuanced analysis in A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts' 
Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification’, European Journal of International Law, 23(1) (2012), 7-41.  
30 Cali, ‘The Disciplinary Account’.   
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Various commentators have attempted to downplay the force of the democratic constitutionalist 
critique, or to explain it away. However, many of these responses have struggled to provide a 
convincing rebuttal to this critique – or, to be more precise, have failed to deliver a knock-out 
blow.   
3.1  The First Response – Amelioration  
Enthusiasts for SIHRL have in general been slow to engage with the democratic 
constitutionalist critique. Instead, they often prefer to emphasise the prudential arguments as 
to why states should adhere to their international treaty commitments, defend the integrity of 
the interpretative practices and legal reasoning deployed by IHRCs, point to the manner in 
which state parties get a say in electing judges to these courts and/or draw attention to the 
considerable room for manoeuvre that states enjoy when it comes to giving effect to IHRC 
judgments.31 Much of the recent literature has also extolled the virtues of ‘dialogue’ between 
IHRCs and national authorities,32 or has otherwise analysed how to improve the quality and 
consistency of the jurisprudence of IHRCs with a view to enhancing their social and normative 
legitimacy.33  
In other words, commentators who are favourably inclined towards IHRCs have tended to 
respond to the democratic constitutionalist critique by highlighting ways in which the tensions 
that exist between SIHRL and the principle of popular sovereignty can be ‘managed’ or 
‘ameliorated’, i.e. addressed through prudential responses by relevant institutional actors 
and/or developments in legal reasoning that could help to reinforce the legitimacy of the status 
quo. These lines of argument are perfectly sound, within their own terms. They provide useful 
insights as to how democratic constitutionalist concerns about the authority of IHRCs can be 
assuaged, or at least smoothed over to some degree. 
However, these arguments do not really engage with the more fundamental issues at stake. As 
Kyritsis neatly puts it in his chapter in this book, deference by national authorities to IHRC 
judgments can be viewed as breaking ‘the line of authorization that must presumably connect 
every political decision with the will of a self-governing people’: arguments to the effect that 
the impact of this ‘break’ can be contained, managed or ameliorated thus do not by themselves 
engage directly with the force of this democratic constitutionalist critique. Even if effective 
steps are taken to ameliorate the tensions that arise in this context, the underlying issues remain 
in play – and any relief is likely to be temporary. 
3.2 The Second Response – Relying upon Consent  
Other commentators have responded to the democratic constitutionalist critique by arguing that 
the agreement of democratically accountable national authorities to be bound by judgments of 
IHRCs provides a sufficient democratic constitutionalist basis for their authority: the 
representatives of the demos have agreed to abide by IHRC judgments, and are consequently 
obliged to show fidelity to the terms of their agreement even if they disagree with specific case 
                                                          
31 As a regular participant in public debates about the ECHR in the UK, the author has noted the frequency with 
which defenders of the Strasbourg Court make these specific arguments in the context of the ongoing Hirst 
controversy.   
32 See e.g. L. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on 
Human Rights System (London: Intersentia, 2016). 
33 See e.g. K. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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outcomes.34 James Nickel has even argued that ‘tacit consent’ on the part of national authorities 
to the evolving interpretative practices of IHRCs can provide a sufficient normative basis for 
the obligation to abide by their judgments.35  
But these consent-based arguments constitute a relatively tenuous response to the democratic 
constitutionalist objection.36 Does consent, whether explicit or tacit in nature, really provide 
enough of a normative basis on which to ground the wide-ranging authority exercised by a 
body such as the Strasbourg Court – especially given that national parliaments often only play 
an indirect role in approving state ratification of international treaties? Can fidelity to the pacta 
sund servanda principle really outweigh democratic constitutionalist concerns? At what point 
can any such consent be qualified and/or subject to new conditions? Are there circumstances 
in which the constraints imposed by IHRC judgments on the functioning of democratic 
governance at national level may be so great as to justify a refusal by a national parliament to 
adhere to its existing commitments under SIHRL? 
Furthermore, consent-based arguments do not provide any substantial reasons as to why a state 
party should be reluctant to withdraw its consent to be bound by the judgments of an IHRC, by 
exercising its right under the relevant international treaty to denounce the jurisdiction of the 
relevant court. At best, consent-based justifications provide an argument as to why a state that 
has ratified an international human rights treaty should continue to respect its provisions as 
long as it remains a party to the relevant treaty instrument. However, they provide no real 
justification as to why a state should not denounce that instrument, if it decides that it no longer 
wishes to be bound by its provisions: the state in question would not be breaching any treaty 
commitments in so doing, and therefore could not be accused of breaching the pacta sund 
servanda principle.  
This weakness in content-based justifications for the authority of IHRCs is often overlooked. 
In debates about the authority of IHRCs, it is often assumed that state denunciation of their 
governing treaty instrument is not a viable option for political reasons – and that only outlier 
states such as Venezuela will ever avail of this option. But the current UK Home Secretary, 
Theresa May MP, has supported it as a solution to the democratic constitutionalist concerns 
generated by the authority of the Strasbourg Court - while the UK government has refused to 
rule it out as a possible long-term policy option.37 Consent-based justifications for the authority 
exercised by IHRCs cannot provide any real rationale as to why such a step would be 
normatively problematic – thereby illustrating the shallow nature of the principled foundations 
it purports to provide for SIHRL in general, and the response it is supposed to offer against 
democratic constitutionalist concerns in particular.      
3.3  The Third Response – The Argument from Democratic Constraint 
A third group of commentators have suggested that the democratic constitutionalist critique 
lacks force precisely because IHRCs play an important role in checking abuses of 
democratically-derived authority at national level. They argue that the standard justifications 
                                                          
34 See e.g. Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument’, p. 139-141. 
35 J. Nickel, On Making Sense of Human Rights (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), p. 47. 
36 The situation is different in respect of mandate abuse claims, as discussed above: in that context, consent 
plays an important role in defining the scope of an IHRC’s mandate. 
37 See T. May, ‘Speech on Brexit’, 25 April 2016, available at 
http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html (last 
accessed 29 May 2016). 
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put forward to justify judicial rights review at domestic level – such as the need to protect 
minorities, or to subject the exercise of state power to checks and balances – also serve to 
legitimate the authority exercised by the Strasbourg Court and other IHRCs.38 In other words, 
this line of argument maintains that the democratic constitutionalist critique lacks bite because 
the role of SIHRL in general, and of IHRCs in particular, is to protect individual rights against 
majoritarian pressures at the domestic level. 
By themselves, these arguments struggle to explain why IHRCs play a distinct and necessary 
role in discharging these rights-protective functions, as distinct from (for example) the national 
courts which perform a similar role. However, an accompanying claim is often made to the 
effect that IHRCs add a valuable additional dimension to domestic forms of legal rights 
protection: they provide an external point of scrutiny, and ensure that states may be called upon 
to justify infringements of fundamental rights in an international forum which is insulated to a 
degree from the political pressures and prevailing ideological prejudices that may apply at 
national level.39 Dworkin has also made the additional argument that international human rights 
frameworks play an important role in helping to redress the vulnerability of individuals to the 
coercive power of the state in which they reside: fidelity to SIHRL regimes such as the ECHR 
thus enhances state legitimacy vis-à-vis their citizens, by providing external constraints on the 
exercise of state power.40 Føllesdal and Cali have similarly argued that the rights review role 
of IHRCs establishes an intrinsically valuable three-way accountability relationship between 
bodies such as the Strasbourg Court, states and the individuals subject to their jurisdiction.41 
Buchanan suggests that the requirements of SIHRL, including the obligation to abide by IHRC 
judgments, can be partially justified by the manner to which it helps to protect individuals 
against the risks inherent in an international legal order which confers ‘eminently abusable 
powers and privileges’ on states.42  
All these arguments have considerable force. However, in and of themselves, they cannot 
trump the democratic constitutionalist objection. In democracies founded upon the principle of 
popular sovereignty, even institutions exercising majoritarian-checking powers are expected to 
be established on the basis of an exercise of constituent power by a national demos. As 
Samantha Besson has argued, human rights protection ‘ought to be the outcome of a 
legalisation process in which human rights-holders can also be the authors of their own 
rights’.43 In other words, even counter-majoritarian rights protective institutions are (perhaps 
paradoxically) assumed to derive their legitimacy at least in part from the principle of popular 
                                                          
38 See e.g. A. Føllesdal, ‘The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Review: The case of the European Court 
of Human Rights’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 40 (2009), 595-607; J. Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy 
of International Human Rights Law’, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 19(1) (2009), 49-88.  
39 Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy’, 79-86. 
40 R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy of International Law’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 41 (2013), 2. 
41 Føllesdal, ‘The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Review’, 595-607.; B. Cali, ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Interpretive Authorities for Human Rights Treaties: An indirect-instrumentalist defence’, in A. 
Føllesdal, J.K. Schaffer and G. Ulfstein (eds) The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2013), p. 141-164. 
42 A. Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 4. 
43 S. Besson, ‘Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context: Decoupling and recoupling’, Ethics & Global 
Politics, 4(1) (2011), 19-50, 30. Mayerfeld contests this, arguing that ‘[i]t is a mistake…to suppose that human 
rights themselves require our consent’: Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy’, 78. But, irrespective of the 
philosophical merits of this position in the abstract, it is difficult to see why a specific institutional system of rights 
protection such as SIHRL should be exempt from the expectation that it should be compatible with the principle 
of popular sovereignty, especially given that such a system co-exists with other more or less effective mechanisms 
for protecting rights at the national and international level. 
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sovereignty - reflecting how rights and democracy are, in Besson’s expression, ‘coupled’ 
together.44 However, the democratic basis of the authority exercised by IHRCs is generally 
quite tenuous, and often lacks any firm basis in an exercise of the popular will.45  
As a consequence, the argument that the authority of IHRCs can be justified on the basis of the 
extra international dimension it adds to domestic forms of rights protection is vulnerable to the 
charge that this extra dimension lacks much in the way of a tangible democratic basis. SIHLR 
may thus add a layer of useful additional rights protection to what is on offer at the national 
level, but this by itself does not constitute a sufficient response to the democratic 
constitutionalist objection.  
This vulnerability is illustrated by the current UK debate, where politicians and judges who are 
critical of the Strasbourg Court repeatedly query the need for an additional European layer of 
legal rights protection which only supplements what is already on offer from Parliament and 
the British courts.46 In their view, any added value that the Strasbourg Court contributes to 
better rights protection is outweighed by its lack of substantive democratic foundations.47   
4. Taking Democratic Constitutionalism Seriously – Can States Legitimately 
‘Disobey’ IHRC Judgments? 
At best, these standard responses to the democratic constitutionalist critique provide valid 
reasons as to why national authorities should continue to abide by the judgments of IHRCs, 
absent some particular reason to reject them on the basis of democratic insufficiency. In other 
words, they provide adequate justification as to why judgments of IHRCs should in general be 
treated as content-independent, authoritative and binding on national authorities (to use the 
language of Raz’s ‘normal justification’ thesis).48 However, national authorities must also 
maintain fidelity to the principle of popular sovereignty and to adhere to their own 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Stone Sweet has argued that the ECHR has been incorporated into European legal systems via an ‘inherently 
constitutional process’: see A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and National 
Constitutional Ordering’, Cardozo Law Review, (2012) 33(5), 1859-1868. However, it is rare for state 
ratification of the ECHR and acceptance of the binding authority of the Strasbourg Court to be underpinned by a 
constitutional provision or some other formal expression of the popular will. (This stands in interesting contrast 
to the situation with EU law and the authority of the Court of Justice of the EU, which is generally underpinned 
by national constitutional provisions which have often been approved via a referendum procedure or some other 
direct expression of the popular will.) What Stone-Sweet describes as the ‘national constitutional reordering’ 
generated by the influence now exerted by the Strasbourg Court over European legal systems has in general 
been brought about by national executives, legislatives and judiciaries choosing to defer to Strasbourg case-law, 
rather than being the product of democratic authorisation from the people at large. 
46 See in general Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’. 
47 See e.g. the analysis set out in Pinto-Duschinsky, Bring Rights Back Home. 
48 Raz’s normal justification thesis, which forms an important element of his general ‘service conception’ of 
authority, states that the normal way to establish that an institution is justified in exercising authority involves 
demonstrating that the putative subjects of its authority are ‘better to comply with reasons which apply to them’ 
by treating the institution’s directives as content-independent, authoritative and binding reasons for action that if 
they adopted some other guide, or tried to follow reasons that apply to them directly: see J. Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 53-69; J. Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the 
Service Conception’, Minnesota Law Review, (2006) 90, 1014. For a useful discussion of the applicability of 
Raz’s thesis in the context of international law, see the chapters by A. Buchanan, ‘Human Rights and the 
Legitimacy of the International Order,’ and J. Tasioulas, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in S. Besson and 
J. Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 79-96 and p. 97-
116 respectively.  
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constitutionally-mandated system of law-making.49 As such, there may be circumstances in 
which the reasons that national authorities have to abide by judgments of IHRCs are 
outweighed by more demanding considerations, namely the need to respect the core democratic 
constitutionalist framework of the state in question.  
National parliaments and other state organs may thus be entitled to ‘disobey’ a judgment of an 
IHRC, or even to repudiate an entire SIHRL regime, if such an act of disobedience can 
legitimately be shown to be necessary to vindicate popular sovereignty. The legal obligation to 
abide by IHRC judgments as set out in treaty provisions like Article 46 of the ECHR is 
therefore best viewed in normative terms as a presumptive or ‘rebuttable’ duty, to use Cali’s 
phraseology: it may be legitimately disregarded when states ‘are able to show that an equally 
important other duty is preventing them from performing it’, such as the duty to maintain 
fidelity with constitutional democratic principles.50 The democratic constitutionalist objection 
thus has both normative and political bite: it provides a platform on which national authorities 
- and in particular national parliaments - can build an arguable case as to why it is legitimate 
for them to disobey IHRC judgments. 
However, in acknowledging that democratic constitutionalist concerns may justify state 
disobedience of IHRC judgments, it is important to recognise that this does not entitle national 
parliaments and other state organs to play this trump card every time they object to a court 
decision that goes against them. As Cali notes, a legal duty such as the obligation to abide by 
IHRC judgments will only be ‘rebuttable’ if a state can demonstrate that it would be otherwise 
impossible for it to give effect to another equally important duty – any other approach would 
end up nullifying the assumed intention of state parties to establish a binding set of treaty 
norms.51  
In other words, democratic constitutionalist concerns can only be invoked to justify non-
compliance with IHRC rulings in exceptional circumstances, when the principle of popular 
sovereignty is at clear risk of being undermined. Furthermore, as discussed below, similar 
reasoning may apply to limit the circumstances in which a state might justifiably chose to 
denounce its treaty obligations to respect IHRC judgments.  
5. Crossing the Threshold – When May States Legitimately Disobey an IHRC 
Judgment? 
State ‘disobedience’ to an IHRC judgment will therefore only be normatively justified in 
situations where the obligation to give effect to such judgments risks undermining popular 
sovereignty. But any controversial IHRC decisions will almost inevitably generate claims that 
this threshold has been crossed. So the question becomes in which circumstances will a state 
be justified in claiming that its obligation to abide by an IHRC judgment is incompatible with 
the first principles of democratic constitutionalism – or, to put it another way, when exactly 
will national parliamentarians be justified in crying wolf?  
This is a complex issue. Different views will inevitably exist as to when a specific IHRC 
judgment might cross the line, or when the influence of an IHRC - in general  - over the shaping 
of national law has become so great as to justify ‘civil disobedience’ on the part of a state. 
                                                          
49 See in general Buchanan and Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law’. 
50 Cali, ‘The Disciplinary Account’. 
51 Ibid. 
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Trying to fix a hard and fast test in this regard is likely to be an exercise in futility, not least 
because the relevant ‘red lines’ may vary from state to state.52 However, certain relevant factors 
can be identified, which may help to clarify when national parliaments and other state organs 
will be acting legitimately in refusing to give effect to a judgment of an IHRC, or indeed 
electing to denounce their treaty obligations to respect such judgments in their entirety.    
First of all, states with an attenuated or purely nominal national democratic system, or whose 
legal system provides little if any effective protection for fundamental rights, will invariably 
struggle to justify disobeying an IHRC judgment. Asserting a right to disobey an IHRC 
decision on the basis that it is incompatible with a state’s commitment to the principles of 
democratic constitutionalism requires that a state takes these principles seriously in the first 
place.53 The argument could also be made that unstable democracies, or societies emerging 
from conflict, should be exceptionally slow to disobey IHRC judgments, given that their 
domestic democratic constitutionalist frameworks will be inherently fragile.  
Secondly, as Buchanan and Powell have argued, the fact that international law obligations may 
limit the freedom of action of state organs does not by itself mean that the principle of popular 
sovereignty has been undermined.54 National authorities – including national parliaments – are 
subject to multiple constraints on their ability to make free use of their powers. In particular, 
transnational regulation invariably imposes certain limitations on their freedom of manoeuvre. 
But, as Buchanan and Powell note, democratic polities often have good reasons to accept these 
external constraints.55 They may be necessary to enable states to co-ordinate their behaviour in 
the interest of achieving common goals – such as securing greater respect for human rights on 
a cross-border basis.56 Furthermore, it is common for such agreements to contain clauses 
requiring state parties to defer to decisions of adjudicative bodies: SIHRL does not differ in 
this respect from other areas of international law. Accepting such constraints on the sovereign 
power of the state is part and parcel of modern governance.  
As such, Buchanan and Powell are correct when they argue that deference to ‘rigorous 
international law’ standards such as the EHRC will only become incompatible with democratic 
constitutionalist principles when a particular tipping-point is reached, namely when the 
‘diminution of self-determination in a constitutional democracy become so great as to be 
incompatible with it warranting the title of a democracy, a territory whose inhabitants are in 
some meaningful sense self-governing’.57 An obligation to abide by an IHRC judgment which 
offends public opinion, or restricts the freedom of action of a national parliament, will not 
necessarily meet this threshold: national authorities will need to point to a more fundamental 
concern – which cuts to the core of what it means to be a self-governing state founded on the 
                                                          
52 Buchanan and Powell have suggested that a possible ‘red line’ in this regard would be if compliance with strong 
international law standards begins to cause substantial alterations to ‘existing constitutional structures’: see 
Buchanan and Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law’, 345-347. However, this 
test may be too circular and question-begging to be of much use: the question of whether deference to IHRCs is 
incompatible with the rules of the existing constitutional system is exactly the point at issue in this regard. 
53 The reader is invited to decide for herself which member states of the Council of Europe or Organisation of 
American States might struggle to meet this qualifying condition.  
54 Buchanan and Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law’, 326.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, ch. 4. 
57 Buchanan and Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law’, 344. 
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basis of popular sovereignty - is required before states will be able to credibly invoke their 
‘right to disobey’. 
Thirdly, to add another element into the mix, it is also important to bear in mind that the 
influence exerted by IHRCs over the shaping of national law need not be inherently counter-
democratic. Instead, it can be argued that it often serves to deepen respect for democratic 
constitutionalist principles both within and outside a state, rather than undermining them. As a 
consequence, it will often be too simplistic to frame conflict between IHRCs and national 
authorities as a straightforward matter of supranational regulation eroding popular sovereignty 
– which in turn inevitably complicates the task of defining the circumstances when a state will 
be justified in disobeying an IHRC judgment, or denouncing its treaty obligations to respect 
such judgments in their entirety.  
In this regard, it can be argued that IHRCs make a distinct and unique contribution to 
reinforcing democratic constitutionalism within states subject to their jurisdiction. Democratic 
constitutionalism derives its claim to normative legitimacy from how it unifies respect for 
democratic will-formation while maintaining a commitment to respect the principle of equal 
liberty of all its citizens by adhering to the rule of law, respecting rights and so on. As Habermas 
argues, this ‘internal relation’ between the exercise of democratic will and the commitment to 
reason develops as a ‘self-correcting learning process’ through which lessons are learnt on an 
incremental basis as to how both principles can be better blended together.58 IHRCs can make 
a distinct contribution to this ‘learning process’. Their judgments can help to pinpoint where 
tensions may exist between state law generated by the process of democratic will-formation 
and the normative logic of human rights, by bringing a detached external perspective to bear 
on issues in respect of which national law may have developed a blind spot.59 Kjaer thus argues 
that ‘nation-state law…in essence remains oriented toward the upholding of already established 
normative expectations’, but ‘transnational law’ such as the ECHR, functions as a ‘learning 
process’, helping national law adopt and adjust to the existence of other normative expectations 
that lie outside its traditional purview. 60 Bellamy and Buchanan have made similar 
arguments.61 
In addition, IHRCs play some part in addressing a latent tension that lies at the heart of 
democratic constitutionalism, namely how it is predicated upon the assumption that all persons 
should enjoy ‘equal liberty’ but then confines participation rights to citizens. Benhabib 
                                                          
58 J. Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, Political Theory 
29 (2001), 766, 766–769.  
59 Indeed, many IHRC decisions have come over time to be acknowledged as significant turning-points in the 
evolution of national constitutional systems: they are absorbed into the ‘story’ of the unfolding rational 
development of domestic law. For example, this is the case with the development of key areas of UK law relating 
to the protection of civil liberties and fundamental rights: see in general C. O’Cinneide, ‘Human Rights and the 
UK Constitution’, in J. Jowell, D. Oliver and C. O’Cinneide (eds.), The Changing Constitution 8th ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 67-103. 
60 P. Kjaer, ‘The Metamorphosis Of The Functional Synthesis: A Continental European Perspective On 
Governance, Law, and the Political In The Transnational Space’, Wisconsin Law Review, (2010), 489-533, 489. 
See also G. de Búrca and O. Gerstenberg, ‘The Denationalisation of Constitutional Law’, Harvard Journal of 
International Law, 47(1) (2006), 243-262, 257-8. 
61 R. Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions: Political 
Constitutionalism and the European Convention of Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law, 25(4) 
(2015), 1019-1042; Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, 108. For an analysis of how such a ‘learning process’ 
can function internally within national law, see A. Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human 
Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 63. 
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(following Arendt) identifies this as an inherent ‘paradox’ that ‘can never be fully resolved in 
democracies’, but whose impact can be ‘mitigated through the renegotiation and reiteration of 
the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination’.62 IHRC judgments 
contribute to this negotiation process by protecting non-nationals and other groups who tend to 
be marginalised within the functioning of national constitutional democratic systems – as 
evidenced by decisions such as, yes, Hirst v UK (No 2).63 
Thus, as Stephen Gardbaum has suggested, the influence exerted by IHRCs over the 
development of national law can help to ‘advance the project of constitutionalism’.64 As a 
result, assertions that the authority of IHRCs is eroding popular sovereignty need to be balanced 
against the positive contribution they make to the development and maintenance of a healthy 
culture of democratic constitutionalism in the state concerned.  
Fourthly, the impact of state disobedience on the authority of IHRCs needs also to be taken 
into account. When states refuse to abide by IHRC judgments, this weakens the status of these 
judgments and may encourage other states to follow suit. In turn, this can undermine the status 
of the relevant treaty instruments. It can also reduce the potential of IHRCs to act as a positive 
force in the development of democratic constitutionalism, both with respect to the specific state 
in question and also vis-à-vis other state parties coming under the same treaty framework.  
This latter point is particularly significant. In deciding whether to disobey an IHRC judgment, 
states need to take account of what impact their disobedience will have on the overall 
functioning of the SIHRL framework in question – and on the inhabitants of other states, who 
may depend more on the IHRC in question to help secure their rights than do the inhabitants 
of the potentially disobeying state.65 Pinto-Duschinsky has dismissed this external dimension 
as irrelevant to the question of whether the authority of the Strasbourg Court is compatible with 
democratic self-governance: in his view, if deferring to the authority of the Strasbourg Court 
undermines democracy in the UK, then ‘that is something too important and too intimate to be 
sacrificed for the supposed but unproven advantage of other peoples’.66 However, this 
argument is too simplistic. If you accept that democratic self-governance is desirable for your 
own country, then it is only logical that you should also be concerned with the health of 
democratic self-governance in other countries. It makes little sense to argue that the moral 
commitment to promote democracy should stop at, say, the English Channel. States may have 
                                                          
62 S. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 35. 
63 This function of SIHRL in general, and IHRCs in particular, lends support to Kumm’s contention that ‘any 
conception of national constitutionalism that takes as basic the idea of free and equals governing themselves is 
internally connected to a cosmopolitan paradigm of constitutionalism. It is ultimately not possible to make sense 
of the idea of constitutional self-government of free and equals within the statist paradigm.’ See M. Kumm, ‘The 
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the 
State’, in J. L. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 258-325, 315.  
64 S. Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights and International Constitutionalism’, in J. L. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds.), 
Ruling The World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 254-55. 
65 Moravcsik has argued that the ECHR system has benefited the emerging democracies of southern and eastern 
Europe by enabling them to ‘lock in’ civil and political rights into their governance cultures, which in turn has 
helped to maintain the foundations of their nascent democratic systems through a period of constitutional 
turbulence. See A. Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe’, International Organisation, 54(2) (2000), 217-252. 
66 M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Bring Rights Back Home: Making human rights compatible with parliamentary 
democracy in the UK, (London: Policy Exchange, 2011), p. 65. 
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legitimate grounds to disobey an IHRC judgment, but in deciding to take that step they need to 
give due weight to the impact of their actions in the round. 
These four factors taken together lend weight to the argument that states should be very slow 
to disobey IHRC judgments, or to denounce their treaty obligations, in this respect, in their 
entirety. These should remain ‘nuclear options’, to be invoked by national parliaments and 
other state actors only in exceptional circumstances – and states should have to bear a heavy 
burden of justification before they escape legal, political and diplomatic censure for failing to 
abide by their treaty commitments.67  
Furthermore, the wriggle room that SIHRL gives to states when it comes to implementing 
IHRC judgments needs to be taken into account. When a state is the subject of a negative 
judgment, national authorities can delay and prevaricate for years before taking any action in 
response. They can also seek to convince the IHRC in question to change its mind or dilute its 
standards, while taking minimal steps to give effect to the initial negative judgment.68 As 
Bellamy notes, there is also a substantial political dimension to the process of enforcing IHRC 
judgments: states cannot usually be compelled to give effect to such judgments as a matter of 
national law, while the extent of diplomatic pressure brought to bear on a non-complying state 
may vary depending on how egregious their non-compliance is perceived to be.69  
It appears therefore that there is little need to amend existing SIHLR instruments to introduce 
a ‘democratic override’ mechanism, or some sort of similar provision designed to allow states 
to reject IHRC judgments. Any such reform risks destabilising the already fragile equilibrium 
of these treaty systems, which in any case already allow states considerable room to push back 
against IHRC judgments to which they object. If national parliaments or other state organs wish 
to disobey an IHRC judgment, then they should do so within the confines of the existing SIHLR 
framework – and be required to satisfy the heavy burden of justification that such a step should 
entail.  
6. Conclusion 
Democratic constitutionalism is underpinned by a commitment to the idea that the authority of 
law-making institutions should be derived from the will of the people - or as Paul Kahn 
expresses it, ‘the polity should express the rule of law’.70 IHRCs, as cosmopolitan courts 
embedded in a ‘statist paradigm’, are vulnerable to the allegation that their authority lacks a 
firm democratic basis. As such, national parliaments and other state organs may in certain 
circumstances be justified in refusing to give effect to IHRC judgments, in the interest of 
maintaining fidelity to the principle of popular sovereignty. However, this ‘red line’ should 
only be crossed in exceptional circumstances – and national authorities should have to bear a 
heavy burden of justification in this regard. National parliaments cannot simply disregard the 
system of rights protection established under the ECHR system between state parties to the 
ECHR and the individuals within their jurisdiction because they disapprove of a particular 
                                                          
67 The authority of IHRCs could thus be viewed as having ‘ecological legitimacy’, to use Buchanan’s phrase: 
i.e. their legitimacy derives in part from their functional relationship with other institutions and international 
actors. See Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, ch. 5. 
68 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Hirst saga in the UK illustrates this point.  
69 Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions’. 
70 P. Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key’, Michigan Law Review, 101(8) (2003), 2677-2707, 
2677. 
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judgment.71 Furthermore, no real justification exists for building some form of ‘democratic 
override’ into the framework of SIHRL.  
                                                          
71 See the evidence given by Jeremy Waldron to the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the UK Parliament, 
Tuesday 15th March 2011, HC 873-i, p. 51.   
